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THAT SICK CHICKEN WON'T HUNT: 
THE LIMITS OF A JUDICIALLY ENFORCED 
NON-DELEGATION DOCTRINE 
George I. Lovell* 
INTRODUCTION 
Since the resolution of the New Deal constitutional crisis, 
the non-delegation doctrine has lived a "fugitive existence at the 
edge of constitutional jurisprudence. "1 Advocates of the doc-
trine argue that legislative delegation of rule-making power to 
the executive branch is unconstitutional, and that the federal 
courts should strike down legislation that delegates. Over the 
last few decades, many constitutional scholars and critics of the 
administrative state have expressed at least passing approval for 
the doctrine, with an occasional thorough exploration and de-
fense-most notably in David Schoenbrod's 1993 book, Power 
Without Responsibility.2 Numerous scholars across the political 
and ideological spectrum seem to accept the critique of the ad-
ministrative process offered by proponents of the non-delegation 
doctrine.3 Nevertheless, the doctrine's existence remains "fugi-
tive," both in the law and in the academy. The Supreme Court 
* Assistant Professor of Government, College of William and Mary. A version of 
this paper was presented at the Law and Society Association I999 annual meeting, Chi-
cago, Illinois. I wish to thank Joel Grossman, Susan Olson, and David Schoenbrod for 
helpful comments on earlier drafts. A College of William and Mary Faculty Summer 
Research Grant supported this project. 
I. Peter L. Aranson, Ernest Gellhorn, and Glen 0. Robinson, A Theory of Legis-
lative Delegation, 68 Cornell L. Rev. I,l7 (1982). 
2. David Schoenbrod, Power Without Responsibility: How Congress Abuses the 
People Through Delegation (Yale U. Press,I993). Other notable and thorough critiques 
of delegation are Aranson, Gellhorn, and Robinson, 68 Cornell L. Rev. I (cited in note 
I); Theodore J. Lowi, The End of Liberalism: The Second Republic of the United States, 
(Norton, 2nd ed. I979). Lowi continues to attack delegation, but his belief that judges 
can solve the problem has waned. See, e.g., Theodore J. Lowi, Two Roads to Serfdom: 
Liberalism, Conservatism, and Administrative Power, 36 Am. U. L. Rev. 295 (I987). 
3. The dust jacket for Schoenbrod's book (cited in note 2) features approving 
quotes from a remarkable combination of people: Bill Bradley, Robert Bork, John Hart 
Ely, Morris Fiorina, and Nadine Strossen. 
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has shown little sustained inclination toward reviving the doc-
trine, and many of the scholars who express some support for it 
don't seem to take it very seriously. 
This paper takes the non-delegation doctrine seriously, but 
argues that even strict judicial enforcement of a ban on legisla-
tive delegation will not necessarily result in dramatic improve-
ments in policies or political accountability in the American 
separation of powers system.4 Earlier critics of the doctrine 
make important and compelling points, but their focus on consti-
tutional and practical problems leads many of them to buy into 
the same misleading assumptions about the connections between 
delegation and accountability that defenders of the doctrine em-
brace. This paper instead challenges the non-delegation doc-
trine by challenging the understanding of political accountability 
relied upon by proponents of the doctrine. I argue that propo-
nents of the doctrine incorrectly give primacy to legislative deci-
sion-making when they think about accountability in our consti-
tutional system, and thus incorrectly conclude that accountability 
can be established or improved by judicial enforcement of a doc-
trine that forces legislators to make more decisions. The struc-
ture of the Constitution means that even a strictly enforced non-
delegation doctrine will not by itself create a system in which ac-
countable legislators have supreme and exclusive law-making 
authority. 
To show that judicial enforcement of a non-delegation doc-
trine cannot solve the problems of accountability identified by 
the doctrine's proponents, I will provisionally accept some of the 
key claims made by defenders of the doctrine. I will assume for 
the sake of argument that the courts have the constitutional 
authority to enforce a non-delegation doctrine and the practical 
capability to prevent legislators from delegating lawmaking 
power to the executive branch. Accepting these assumptions 
4. Unlike other critics of the non-delegation doctrine, I will not focus on the ar-
guments that advocates use to locate the doctrine in the Constitution's text and history, 
see, e.g., Harold J. Krent, Delegation and Its Discontents, 94 Colum. L. Rev. 710 (1994) 
(reviewing David Schoenbrod, Power Without Responsibility (1993)); Book Note, Dele-
gation Without Accountability 108 Harvard L. Rev. 751 (1995) (reviewing David Schoen-
brod, Power Without Responsibility (1993)). Nor will I argue that it is impossible for 
judges to solve the practical problem of inventing a feasible and coherent test of uncon-
stitutional delegation. Sec, e.g., Krent, 94 Colum. L. Rev. at 734-52; Richard B. Stewart, 
Beyond Delegation Doctrine, 36 Am. U. L. Rev. 323 (1987); Richard J. Pierce, Political 
Accountability and Delegated Power: A Response to Professor Lowi, 36 Am. U. L. Rev. 
391 (1987). I also will not mount a freestanding defense of the desirability of insulated 
bureaucratic decision-making processes. Jerry L. Mashaw, Prodelegation: Why Admin-
istrators Should Make Political Decisions, 1 J.L. Econ. & Org. 81 (1985). 
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allows me to focus on a question that has not yet received 
enough attention: Would a judicially created "world without 
delegation" be a world of greater democratic accountability than 
today's world? 
I find that the surface attractiveness of the non-delegation 
doctrine masks some rather large gaps in its proponents' account 
of the way that representation and democratic accountability 
work in the American separation of powers system. Proponents 
of the non-delegation doctrine urge the courts to bring an end to 
delegation as a means of restoring or improving democratic ac-
countability. And proponents of the doctrine usually do a very 
good job demonstrating that there are problems with account-
ability in the current world of rampant delegation. But they 
have failed to demonstrate a link between accountability and 
delegation that is strong enough to prove that ending delegation 
will solve the problems of accountability that they identify. In 
response, I argue that proponents of the non-delegation doctrine 
have underestimated the complexity of problems of account-
ability and thus overestimated the importance of delegation to 
problems of accountability. Critics of delegation and proponents 
of the non-delegation doctrine have mistaken one symptom of 
some underlying problems with accountability in our constitu-
tional system for the cause of those problems. 
The observation that delegation is a symptom rather than a 
cause emerges after a more careful consideration of how legisla-
tors and voters could respond to strict judicial enforcement of a 
non-delegation doctrine. Proponents of the doctrine often admit 
to considerable uncertainty about the precise results of strict ju-
dicial enforcement of the non-delegation doctrine.5 But they are 
apparently so unimpressed with the advantages of delegation, 
and so appalled by the harms they associate with delegation, that 
they are willing to take a plunge into the unknown. I agree that 
the precise consequences of a judicial ban on delegation are dif-
ficult to predict, but I am less convinced that judicial interven-
tion alone will dramatically improve the capacity of the people 
to hold legislators accountable or to force legislators to produce 
better policies. While critics suggest that delegation is an aberra-
tion in the constitutional system because it allows legislators to 
escape accountability, I argue that the Constitution has always 
allowed, and will continue to allow, legislators to use a wide va-
riety of strategies to avoid accountability. Strict judicial en-
5. See, e.g., Schoenbrod, Power Without Responsibility at 196 (cited in note 2). 
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forcement of the non-delegation doctrine may prompt legislators 
to shift to one of these alternative strategies for escaping ac-
countability. But the non-delegation doctrine cannot create a 
system in which Congress alone makes the laws or a system in 
which majoritarian processes in Congress are sufficient to guar-
antee that outcomes have democratic legitimacy. 
Thus, while it is possible to imagine some worlds without 
delegation in which there is greater accountability, it does not 
seem likely that the courts alone can create such a world. Im-
proved accountability can be achieved within the Constitution's 
flexible framework only if judicial resolve is accompanied by 
numerous other, equally revolutionary, changes in the electorate 
and in the structure of the intermediary organizations (e.g., par-
ties, interest groups, mass-media organizations) through which 
people participate in politics. Because court enforcement of the 
non-delegation doctrine cannot force those changes, there is lit-
tle hope that judicial enforcement of the doctrine will solve the 
problems of accountability identified by proponents of the non-
delegation doctrine. 
Part one of the paper explains some of the connections be-
tween the non-delegation doctrine and the dominant theoretical 
framework for understanding accountability in the constitutional 
system of separation of powers. I use these connections to es-
tablish the importance of the debate over delegation in constitu-
tional theory, and to suggest some reasons for the puzzling status 
of the doctrine among constitutional scholars. Part two explores 
and rejects three potential explanations of why the doctrine will 
improve accountability. Part three examines some of the limits 
on the power of judges to ensure the integrity of legislative 
choices in a post-delegation world by focusing on one very likely 
alternative legislative strategy for avoiding accountability: the 
use of deliberate legislative ambiguity to shift decisions to the 
courts. I conclude by noting the need for a more satisfying ex-
planation of accountability in the American constitutional sys-
tem, and make some suggestions toward developing an alterna-
tive account that better matches both the theory and the lived 
experience of the United States Constitution. 
I. DELEGATION, ACCOUNTABILITY, AND THE 
COUNTER-MAJORITARIAN FRAMEWORK 
Critics of delegation claim that legislative delegation to ex-
ecutive branch agencies is bad because it produces bad policies 
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and weakens the accountability provided by electoral controls on 
legislators. Legislative delegation to the executive branch alleg-
edly creates these problems by shifting responsibility for making 
important policy choices from elected officials in Congress to 
unelected bureaucrats in executive branch agencies. When deci-
sions are properly made in Congress, electoral controls on indi-
vidual members make those members reluctant to support poli-
cies that benefit narrow interests. However, if Congress 
delegates the power to make decisions to agency bureaucrats, 
the lack of electoral controls on those bureaucrats allows con-
centrated interests to exert a corrupt influence on agency deci-
sion-making processes. Shifting such decisions to the executive 
branch also allows legislators to escape accountability because it 
allows them to blame the executive branch agencies for any un-
popular decisions. Based on this understanding of delegation, 
the critics conclude that ending delegation will improve account-
ability. By intervening and striking down all statutes that dele-
gate, judges would force legislators to take responsibility for the 
"hard choices" involved in regulatory policy-making. Forcing 
legislators to make those choices will make it less likely that the 
government will produce policies that favor narrow interests at 
the expense of a broader public.6 
David Schoenbrod adds to the surface plausibility of this 
analysis by using concrete examples of delegated regulatory de-
cisions gone awry. Schoenbrod devotes a great deal of attention 
to a favorite example, the regulation of navel oranges in the 
1980s.7 Such regulation came in the form of marketing orders, 
issued by the Secretary of Agriculture under powers originally 
delegated by Congress in the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 
1933.8 Schoenbrod convincingly argues that the marketing or-
ders issued during the 1980s established bad policies that served 
narrow interests and harmed the general public. Congress em-
powered an Agriculture Department advisory board to make 
decisions on marketing orders. One industry actor, Sunkist, was 
able to dominate the decision-making processes on that board. 
Sunkist convinced the board to fix an artificially high price for 
oranges, a policy that advanced Sunkist's interests at the expense 
of both smaller growers and the general public.9 
6. On this last point, see id. at 16-18,99-106, 119-34. 
7. Id at 47-57, 108, 114, 116, 140-42, 169-70. 
8. Id at 4. 
9. Id at 50-51. 
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Schoenbrod blames this outcome on the ability of Congress 
to delegate. Delegation shifted the decisions to an obscure wing 
of the executive branch, making it likely that the public would 
pay little attention (and perhaps not even notice that the price 
supports existed). Because delegation allowed the executive 
branch to issue the marketing orders without members of Con-
gress taking a direct vote to create them, members of Congress 
expected to be able to blame the Department of Agriculture if 
anyone noticed the harmful orders and complained. At the 
same time, delegation allowed members of Congress to win sup-
port from the concentrated interests that expected to benefit 
from the shift in authority.10 
The critique of delegation made by Schoenbrod and other 
advocates of the non-delegation doctrine is based on a particular 
understanding of how accountability is supposed to work. The 
critics assume that legislative decision-making occupies a sort of 
privileged position when establishing or measuring accountabil-
ity. In this respect, the critique of delegation is connected to the 
dominant theoretical framework that constitutional scholars use 
to understand democratic accountability in the separation of 
powers system. I call that framework the counter-majoritarian 
framework because its current dominance can be traced back to 
Alexander Bickel's claim, in The Least Dangerous Branch, that 
the power of judicial review created a "counter-majoritarian 
problem" in American democracy. Bickel claimed that judicial 
review was a "deviant" institution in American democracy be-
cause the power allowed unelected judges to make decisions that 
reversed the choices made by elected legislatures.11 Although 
Bickel was primarily concerned with explaining judicial review, 
the basic assumptions of his framework have wider application. 
The counter-majoritarian framework's understanding of ac-
countability in the separation of powers system begins with the 
observation that the Constitution establishes different branches 
of government, sketches the different duties of each branch, and 
outlines separate methods for selecting the decision-makers in 
10. ld at 54-57. 
II. Alexander M. Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch: The Supreme Coun at the 
Bar of Politics (Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1962). See also Stephen P. Croley, The Majoritarian 
Difficulty: Elective Judiciaries and the Rule of Law, 62 U. Chi. L. Rev. 689, 712 n.66 
(1995), for a list of prominent scholars who note the continued centrality of the Bickel's 
framework. Bickel's framework has lately been blamed for some important ills that be-
set constitutional theory, see, e.g., Rebecca L. Brown, Accountability, Liberty, and the 
Constitution, 98 Colurn. L. Rev. 531 (1998) but the book remains far more nuanced and 
sophisticated than its current critics seem to remember. 
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each branch. The distinctively counter-majoritarian moves are 
to make the differences in the methods for selecting decision-
makers central to understanding accountability in each inde-
pendent branch, and to make legislative outcomes the baseline 
against which the democratic or majoritarian legitimacy of inter-
branch outcomes are measured. The counter-majoritarian theo-
rists associate differences in methods of selecting decision-
makers with different levels of accountability, and then use those 
differences among the branches to place each branch into a hier-
archy of the branches. In that hierarchy, Congress occupies the 
most exalted position because (since the adoption of the 17th 
Amendment) each of the principal decision-makers in that 
branch must face regular popular election. The courts, however, 
finish a distant third to the two "elective" branches of govern-
ment because of the weak and indirect electoral controls on judi-
cial decisions. Judicial influence over policy is thus properly ex-
ercised only in the unusual set of circumstances that warrant 
exercise of the power of judicial review. 
The pervasive practice of legislative delegation in today's 
polity disrupts this counter-majoritarian framework because 
delegation challenges some of the assumptions that underlie the 
framework's obsession with legislative outcomes as the baseline 
for legitimacy and accountability. The counter-majoritarian 
framework assumes, for example, that the branches act inde-
pendently and compete with each other for influence over pol-
icy. The framework also assumes that the branches act in a fixed 
sequence, in which Congress first establishes a policy that serves 
as the baseline against which to evaluate the legitimacy of deci-
sions later made in other branches. 12 
When Congress delegates, however, Congress deliberately 
refrains from choosing a particular policy outcome, and instead 
empowers the relevant executive branch department or agency 
to make those choices. This means that scholars cannot assess 
the final policy outcome at the end of the implementation proc-
ess by comparing it to some baseline position established in 
Congress when the legislation passed. As critics of delegation 
12. The executive branch presumably finishes somewhere between Congress and 
the courts in the counter-majoritarian hierarchy of the branches. The president has a 
unique status as the only nationally elected official, and in theory has control over many 
of the decisions made in the hierarchically structured executive branch. However, few 
observers are satisfied that such hierarchical control is effective enough to produce elec-
toral accountability. 
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often point out, delegation amounts to a refusal to establish such 
a baseline. 
Delegation also undermines the claim that unelected judges 
can ensure the legitimacy of their interpretation of statutes by 
deferring to the intent of a more accountable Congress. In a 
world with delegation, judicial deference to legislative intentions 
merely shifts decisions from unaccountable judges to perhaps 
equally unaccountable bureaucrats in the executive branch. 
Some of the scholars who work within the counter-
majoritarian framework do take the time to notice the existence 
of the modern executive branch. Such scholars have tried to re-
spond to the glaring fact that so many of the actual legislative 
outputs that Congress produces fail to make the kinds of policy 
choices that their theoretical framework envisions. Many such 
scholars respond by declaring that delegation is itself a deviant 
practice or historical aberration that is foreign to the overall con-
stitutional scheme.13 This move leads those scholars to suggest 
that delegation is something that judges should, at a minimum, 
discourage. 
However, what is curious about the embrace of the critique 
of delegation by these scholars is that, with the admirable excep-
tion of David Schoenbrod, the embrace seems half-hearted. 
John Hart Ely provides a good example. Ely explicitly defends 
the non-delegation doctrine in Democracy and Distrust but his 
defense comes across as less than completely sincere. 14 After a 
lengthy, nuanced account of the way judicial power can be used 
to supplement and reinforce representation in legislatures and 
thus improve accountability, Ely devotes just four pages to an 
alleged rise in delegation. Ely expresses both support for the 
non-delegation doctrine and doubts about the likelihood of the 
Court's adopting and enforcing it. Ely's almost passing refer-
ence to the non-delegation doctrine strikes this reader as odd. 
The doctrine, by Richard Pierce's estimate, calls for striking 
down perhaps ninety-nine percent of our current regulatory 
statutes.15 If the Court did follow Ely's suggestion, the conse-
quences would be far more dramatic than the cumulative conse-
quences of all the doctrines to which Ely gives a more thorough 
13. Sec, e.g., John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust: A Theory of Judicial Review 
131·34 (Harvard U. Press, 1980); Bickel, Least Dangerous Branch at 158-62 (cited in note 
11). 
14. Ely, Democracy and Distrust at 131-34 (cited in note 13) 
15. Pierce, Political Accountability and Delegated Power at 401 (cited in note 4). 
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treatment in the other 180 pages of his book. It seems especially 
odd to conclude a book devoted to developing a framework for 
judicial restraint by saying, in effect, "Oh, by the way, most of 
the existing U.S. Code is unconstitutional and deserves to be 
struck down but we needn't worry about that because it isn't 
likely to happen." 
Many other scholars have been content to take a path simi-
lar to the one charted by Ely: Treat delegation as a harmful his-
torical aberration, announce some form of lukewarm support for 
some doctrine that limits delegation, but stop short of embracing 
the dramatic consequences that a judicial ban on delegation 
would cause, usually after noting that judges lack the chutzpah 
to try it. Ironically, this is true not just of scholars like Ely, for 
whom the non-delegation doctrine is a subsidiary concern, but 
also of scholars who have developed some of the most compel-
ling critiques of the practice of delegation and the strongest de-
fenses of the non-delegation doctrine. Scholars have not de-
voted much attention to explaining what accountability and 
policy-making will look like in a post-delegation world. 16 
I submit that the difficulty that delegation poses for the 
counter-majoritarian framework helps to explain the scholarly 
16. Lowi, End of Liberalism (cited in note 2), and Aranson, Gellhom, and Robin-
son, 68 Cornell L. Rev. at 7-21 (cited in note 1) review judicial decisions and defend the 
doctrine, but they doubt that the courts will revive the doctrine and don't fully explain 
how revival would create accountability. The exception to the pattern is David Schoen-
brod, the doctrine's most accomplished defender. To his credit, Schocnbrod readily ad-
mits that the doctrine he advocates requires judges to take on a startlingly activist role, 
and even scripts a twelve year plan that judges can use to ease the transition to a world 
without delegation. Schoenbrod, Power Without Responsibility at 180-91 (cited in note 
2). 
Scholarly ambivalence has been mirrored and supported by the courts. The Su-
preme Court has never rejected the ban on legislative delegation articulated in Schechter 
Poultry, but other than an infrequent mention in a dissenting or concurring opinion, the 
courts have not moved very far toward the dramatic strategy that Schoenbrod advocates. 
Judicial decisions on the doctrine are reviewed in Schoenbrod, Power Without Responsi-
bility, at 25-46, (cited in note 2); Aranson, Gellhorn, and Robinson, 68 Cornell L. Rev. at 
7-18 (cited in note 1); and Jerry L. Mashaw, Greed, Chaos, and Governance: Using Public 
Choice to Improve Public Law 132-36 (Yale U. Press, 1997). Judicial ambivalence rein-
forces the scholarly ambivalence because it allows scholars to fall back on the "realistic" 
position that the courts will not embrace the doctrine any time soon. 
A 1999 decision by the D.C. Circuit (American Trucking Ass'ns, Inc. v. United Stares 
EnvtL Protection Agency, 175 F.3d 1027) rejected an EPA construction of a statute after 
claiming that the construction effected an unconstitutional delegation of legislative 
power. While the case attracted attention, the court did not take the bold approach ad-
vocated by leading proponents of the non-delegation doctrine. Instead of focusing its 
wrath on Congress for writing a bad statute, the court criticized the EPA. Demonstrating 
a lack of chutzpah, the court remanded the controversy to the agency (to come up with a 
new rule) rather than to Congress (to come up with a statute that did not delegate). 
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ambivalence that gives the non-delegation doctrine its "fugitive 
existence." Faced with the threat that pervasive delegation 
poses to their theoretical framework, constitutional scholars 
have the choice of either 1) abandoning the framework, or 2) de-
claring delegation to be an aberrational and/or intolerable prac-
tice within the existing framework. Too many have chosen the 
latter course.17 The fact that so many scholars have made that 
choice is one reason why, at the end of a century when executive 
branch actors have taken over more and more lawmaking func-
tions, scholarly work on accountability under the Constitution is 
still dominated by a framework that cannot make much sense of 
the means through which most of our regulatory law is made-
executive branch policy-making. 
The remainder of this paper argues that the uneasy am-
bivalence about delegation should not be resolved by treating 
delegation as an aberrational practice or quietly urging the 
Court to end it. Nor, for that matter, should it be resolved by 
continually coming up with new arguments that defend executive 
branch lawmaking from within the existing theoretical frame-
work.18 A better way of resolving the ambivalence about delega-
tion is to reject the dominant framework for understanding 
democratic accountability in a constitutional system of separa-
tion of powers. That dominant framework simply cannot be 
reconciled with the lawmaking practices that our Constitution 
has created, not just since the New Deal but from the very be-
ginning. I turn first to the task of examining further the threat 
that delegation poses to the Constitution's system of account-
ability. 
17. Recently, there have been some attempts to document the imponancc of execu-
tive branch discretionary decision-making and incorporate it into models for under-
standing the legitimacy and impact of judicial decisions. Seth F. Kreimer, Exploring the 
Dark Matter of Judicial Review: A Constitutional Census of the 1990s, 5 Wm. & Mary Bill 
Rts. J. 427 (1997); Matthew D. Adler, Judicial Restraint in the Administrative State: Be-
yond the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, 145 U. Pa. L. Rev. 759 (1997). However, such 
scholars are still outnumbered by those who have declined to modify the dominant 
framework. 
18. For example, scholars like Stewan and Mashaw have suggested that delegated 
decisions can be connected to democratic processes through effective procedural con-
straints on administrative processes. See Richard B. Stewan, The Reformation of Ameri-
can Administrative Law, 88 Harv. L. Rev. 1667 (1975); Mashaw, Greed, Chaos, and Gov-
ernance (cited in note 16). 
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II. DELEGATION AND ACCOUNTABILITY 
Schoenbrod's example of navel orange regulation is com-
pelling because the process he describes seems so indefensible. 
The marketing orders helped to fatten one already dominant 
group without producing any offsetting public benefit. However, 
it is still possible to question whether such examples mount an 
effective attack on delegation. Given that almost all regulatory 
statutes delegate, the fact that critics of delegation can tell hor-
ror stories about regulations issued by agencies does not prove 
that delegation causes all the problems that the critics identify. 
They may be confusing correlation with causation.19 To support 
the non-delegation doctrine, the critics need a strong causal ar-
gument that links their horror stories to delegation, and a more 
complete explanation of how judicial enforcement of a non-
delegation doctrine will improve accountability. 
In this section, I consider and reject three complementary 
explanations of how ending delegation will improve account-
ability. I derive these explanations from the complaints that de-
fenders of the non-delegation doctrine make about delegation. 
The first explanation is that ending delegation will force mem-
bers of Congress to take more decisive stands on regulatory is-
sues. The second explanation is that ending delegation will im-
prove accountability by locating decisions in the branch of 
government to which people are more likely to pay attention. 
The third explanation is that ending delegation will improve 
democratic accountability by restoring some important constitu-
tional limits on congressional power. None of these explanations 
turns out to be entirely convincing. In each case, critics of dele-
gation fail to appreciate that even if the courts deprive Congress 
of the power to delegate rule-making authority to executive 
branch agencies, Congress would retain numerous substitute 
19. For example, it seems to me that one can construct an argument that our cur-
rent system of campaign finance caused the problems in the navel orange case-an ar-
gument just as strong as Schoenbrod's argument that delegation caused those problems. 
Schoenbrod himself provides support for this alternative causal account when he explains 
how the dominant navel orange interests used campaign contributions to ensure congres-
sional compliance in the navel orange program. Schoenbrod, Power Without Responsi-
bility at 8 (cited in note 2). It may also be that preventing contributions like those from 
corrupting the legislative process would do more to prevent such rent-seeking policies 
than a judicially enforced non-delegation doctrine. It also seems to me quite clear that 
t~e problems of our current system of campaign finance arc not unrelated to the propcn-
suy of many members of Congress to support rent-seeking regulatory policies, and their 
subsequent need to hide the sources and consequences of those policies through delega-
tion. Happily, however, the issue of campaign finance and the associated constitutional 
complications are well beyond the scope of this paper. 
90 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 17:79 
strategies that circumvent democratic controls just as capably as 
current forms of legislative delegation. 
Explanation 1: Forcing Congress to go on Record Regarding 
Unpopular Programs 
Critics often complain that delegation allows members of 
Congress to establish new regulatory policies without going on 
record with a "yes" or "no" vote on particular regulatory rules. 
For example, Schoenbrod complains that members of Congress 
could selectively avoid responsibility for the navel orange mar-
keting orders because members never had to indicate unambi-
guously their approval or disapproval of the orders issued by the 
executive branch.20 
An initial problem with this complaint is that it is not en-
tirely accurate. Even in a world with delegation, voters can usu-
ally trace regulatory decisions to "yes" or "no" votes cast by 
their representatives in Congress. It is true that members of 
Congress do not cast "yes" or "no" votes on particular rules cre-
ated by agencies, but they do quite often need to go on record 
with "yes" or "no" votes that make agency activities possible. 
Legislators must cast votes to establish executive branch agen-
cies and to give those agencies the authority to make regulatory 
decisions. The democratic controls created by such votes 
weaken over time. (Most of the voters who voted for the legisla-
tors who passed the Agricultural Adjustment Act are now dead). 
But members of Congress need to take at least one vote per year 
(on the relevant appropriations bill) in order for any regulatory 
program to continue, and circumstances sometimes force mem-
bers to cast additional votes on particular programs. 
Since no regulatory program can operate without being cre-
ated and continually authorized by Congress, there is nothing 
about delegation that prevents an unhappy electorate from 
holding members of Congress accountable for regulatory power 
exercised by the agencies. Opponents of incumbents are cer-
tainly free to make such votes an issue in the next campaign, and 
they sometimes do. Representative George Nethercutt (R-
Washington) recently found this out the hard way from an ad 
sponsored by some of his political opponents. Nethercutt 
probably did not know that he had voted for the Endangered 
20. Schoenbrod, Power Without Responsibility at 54-55, 102, 103-05 (cited in note 
2). 
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Species Act twelve times until he saw an ad that recounted his 
votes on various appropriations and authorizations items.21 
Schoenbrod's own example of delegation gone awry in na-
vel orange regulation confirms that regulatory programs can 
continue only because members of Congress take recorded votes 
to support them. Schoenbrod notes that the marketing orders he 
attacks were only possible because Congress passed a special ap-
propriations rider that exempted the orders from the anti-
regulatory review programs of Reagan's OMB. In the House, 
opponents of the marketing orders forced a floor vote on the 
rider that determined whether' the program could continue. The 
marketing orders won that recorded vote, 319 to 97.22 That out-
come does not bode well for those who think ending delegation 
will automatically right the ship of state. Sunkist was apparently 
able to buy elected members of Congress just as easily as Sunkist 
was able to capture executive branch regulators.23 
Schoenbrod and other critics might respond to these obser-
vations by claiming that the problem is not that delegation 
makes it impossible for the people to hold legislators account-
able, but that delegation makes it exceedingly difficult to do so. 
Schoenbrod claims that delegation is harmful because it allows 
legislators to hide their choices in technical votes that fail to 
frame issues clearly: "appropriations riders do not attract the 
same level of public attention as legislation to raise the price or 
cut the supply of a widely used commodity."24 Schoenbrod 
seems to be suggesting that the people would have paid more at-
tention if Congress had been forced to address the marketing 
orders more directly, e.g., by voting on the orders themselves 
rather than on some obscure exemption from a regulatory re-
view procedure. 
Schoenbrod's suggestion that the people would have paid 
more attention to a direct congressional endorsement of the 
price fixing program has some merit. Unfortunately, the sugges-
tion is of limited relevance to the debate over the non-delegation 
doctrine. The suggestion would be relevant if we imagined that 
a judicially enforced non-delegation doctrine would force Con-
gress to take a recorded vote on the "Inflate the Price of Orange 
21. Jake Tapper, Endangered Congressman?, Salon Magazine (May 5, 1999) 
<http://www .salon.cornlnewslfeature/1999/05/05nimits/index.html>. 
22. Schoenbrod, Power Without Responsibility at 52 (cited in note 2). 
23. Id. at 8. 
24. ld at 55. 
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Juice in Order to Line the Pockets of the Fat Cat Orange Grow-
ers Act of 2000." The problem, however, is that the non-
delegation doctrine, even in the strong form proposed by 
Schoenbrod, cannot force Congress to address regulatory prob-
lems in such a stark form. Since the Constitution explicitly gives 
Congress control over its internal decision-making procedures, 
members would retain considerable power to structure votes to 
serve their own interests and to hide controversial votes. The 
non-delegation doctrine cannot prevent Congress from burying 
divisive regulatory decisions in the technical details of omnibus 
regulatory bills, or in bills with misleading names and provisions. 
For example, Congress could presumably bundle all the rules in 
the current Code of Federal Regulations into a single bill. 
Members of Congress who voted for such a bill could escape re-
sponsibility for any unpopular programs included in it by point-
ing to other, more popular, items in the compromise package. 
Thus, the desirability of forcing Congress to vote on regula-
tory rules does not provide much support for the claim that the 
non-delegation doctrine will solve the problems of accountability 
that delegation seems to create. Members of Congress already 
have to cast such votes in order for agencies to exercise dele-
gated power. The new doctrine would force members of Con-
gress to cast votes on particular rules, but members would retain 
the ability to shield those votes from public attention and the 
power to take responsibility for regulatory programs only selec-
tively. Accountability might be improved by forcing Congress to 
vote separately on each regulatory program, but neither the non-
delegation doctrine nor anything else in the Constitution forces 
Congress to do so. 
Explanation 2: Relocating Regulatory Decisions 
It is, however, possible to improve on the first explanation 
by supplementing it. Critics of delegation suggest that some-
thing about the nature of decision-making processes in bureau-
cratic agencies adds to problems of accountability. Critics con-
clude that accountability breaks down in cases involving 
delegation because the public lacks the capacity to pay sufficient 
attention to regulatory decisions in the agencies. The non-
delegation doctrine may improve accountability by simply en-
suring that the decisions are made in Congress, the location 
where the public is most able to pay attention. 
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Critics of delegation sometimes suggest an explanation of 
this type when they characterize agency decision-making proc-
esses. Critics claim that delegation erodes accountability be-
cause it makes policy-making processes complicated, obscure, or 
just plain boring. Schoenbrod claims that public opinion is often 
dampened by "prolonged administrative procedures" making 
public opinion "less powerful" in an administrative setting than 
"in an open legislative battle. "25 Delegation allows Congress to 
defeat the democratic controls by leaving Congress free to add 
enough layers of decision-making authority to make sure that 
the process always exhausts the public's limited capacity to pay 
attention. Faced with such complexity, the people will not 
bother to identify and punish the legislators responsible for the 
bad policies. 
Critics of delegation often use claims of this sort to add a 
strong normative component to their arguments. Schoenbrod, 
for example, contrasts the "unsophisticated interests" most often 
the victims of delegation with the "sophisticated interests" that 
pressure Congress to delegate. "Sophisticated interests" like 
Sunkist benefit from delegation because they possess the re-
sources to monitor and influence agency decision-making proc-
esses. Meanwhile the "unsophisticated" interests, a much larger 
group, pay the dispersed costs of rent-seeking regulations that 
they are often too duped to notice.26 
The problem, however, is that critics of delegation wield a 
double-edged sword when they complain about the mass public's 
limited capacity to pay attention to regulatory decisions. By 
emphasizing how difficult it is for the public to pay sufficient at-
tention to the details of government processes, and arguing that 
it is easy for "sophisticated" interests to dupe the masses, critics 
of delegation make it more difficult to believe that judges can 
create significant improvements in accountability by enforcing a 
strict non-delegation doctrine. It is hard to see how ending dele-
gation will make the masses more sophisticated or lengthen their 
• 27 
attention span. 
25. Id. at 77. 
26. On the link between concentrated benefits, dispersed costs, and delegation, see 
Morris Fiorina, Group Concentration and the Delegation of Legislative Authority, in 
Roger G. Noll, ed., Regulatory Policy and the Social Sciences 175-97 (U. of California 
Press, 1985); Michael T. Hayes, The Semi-Sovereign Pressure Groups: A Critique of Cur-
rent Theory and an Alternative Typology, 40 Journal of Politics 134 (1978). 
27. Mashaw argues against the non-delegation doctrine by suggesting in part that 
delegation does not result in a loss of relevant information for most voters because most 
voters rely on rough assessments of candidate ideology to make decisions about how to 
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More importantly, if the courts were to end delegation, the 
capacity of the public to monitor decisions in Congress would be 
severely tested. Congress would presumably be forced to make 
more decisions-and more complicated decisions-about the de-
tails of regulatory policies. Presumably, much of the boredom 
that the public now associates with the administrative processes 
would simply be transferred to Congress, along with the respon-
sibility for making many of the boring decisions that used to be 
made in the agencies. 
The critics of delegation could respond to these concerns by 
arguing that in today's world of rampant delegation, it is the lo-
cation, and not the technical content, of the decisions that cre-
ates the boredom. Perhaps there is some inherent feature of bu-
reaucratic decision making that mutes public (or perhaps media) 
attention to agency decisions. Arguments of this sort have been 
made about judicial decision-making. Girardeau Spann, for ex-
ample, worries about the power of judges to "legitimate" un-
popular outcomes, and suggests that people quietly accept policy 
outcomes established by judges, even when the same people 
would actively resist the same policy outcomes had they been es-
tablished by elected legislators.28 Unfortunately, however, it is 
quite difficult to extend Spann's arguments about the mystical 
legitimating powers of judges to the considerably less mystical 
powers of bureaucrats. It seems quite unlikely that people on 
the receiving end of a bad regulation would fail to complain sim-
ply because they fell under some hypnotic spell of bureaucratic 
infallibility. Indeed, critics of delegation sometimes emphasize 
that one problem with bureaucratic decision making is that the 
vote, not on information about how legislators voted on particular details of particular 
policies. Mashaw, Greed, Chaos, and Governance at 139-40 (cited in note 16). Schocn-
brod recently responded by saying that a judicial ban on delegation will improve ac-
countability even if voters do not pay attention to the details of legislation. This is be-
cause ending delegation will mean that legislators will no longer be able to avoid floor 
fights on contentious issues. Schoenbrod claims that "the fulcrum of legislative responsi-
bility is not the statute but the floor fight," Schoenbrod, Delegation and Democracy: A 
Reply to My Critics, 20 Cardozo L. Rev. 731, 744 (1999), in part because "[f)loor fights 
are newsworthy and attract public interest," id at 745. However, there is no guarantee 
that choices will be fought out on the floor just because they are written into legislation. 
Furthermore, if the framers of the Constitution were convinced that the floor fight was 
the "fulcrum of responsibility," it is odd that they did not include provisions in the Con-
stitution ensuring that those fights would be carried out in the open. Congress can close 
the door on a floor fight when it wants. It is public vigilance, not judicial enforcement of 
a constitutional doctrine, that keeps most debates open. 
28. Girardeau A. Spann, Race Against the Court: The Supreme Court and Minorities 
in Contemporary America, 150-60 (N.Y.U. Press, 1993). 
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public accords bureaucratic decisions less legitimacy than deci-
sions made in Congress.29 
Of course, there is no reason to take the current capacity of 
the public to pay attention to the details of regulatory processes 
as a permanent fact about the world. The current low level of 
public attention to agency decisions may be a product of the 
rampant use of delegation. The public might be calculating that 
it is not worth monitoring government decisions when the offi-
cials most responsible for harmful decisions are likely to be in-
sulated from electoral controls. Those calculations might change 
in a world without delegation because people will instinctively 
assume that responsibility for decisions rests with elected offi-
cials in Congress. Seen in this light, the claim that ending dele-
gation will improve the public's capacity to pay attention to 
regulatory decisions is more plausible. 
While these considerations provide a coherent story of one 
source of improved accountability in a world without delegation, 
they do not prove that judicial enforcement of a non-delegation 
doctrine will, on balance, improve accountability or improve the 
position of "unsophisticated" interests. The added congressional 
workload and added need for congressional attention to detail 
that the non-delegation doctrine would create could still exhaust 
the public's newly stimulated appetite for monitoring Congress. 
And because Congress would retain numerous avenues for com-
plicating and obscuring its choices, there might still be opportu-
nities for members of Congress to do favors for their most so-
phisticated friends and to hide their most cynical compromises. 
Explanation 3: Restoring Constitutional Limits on Legislation 
A third explanation of how the non-delegation doctrine im-
proves accountability is that ending delegation will restore some 
important constitutional limitations on Congress's power. Ac-
cording to some critics of delegation, the framers of the Consti-
tution wanted to ensure that Congress would not pass legislation 
unless, after careful deliberation, a strong consensus formed in 
favor of a new law. To inhibit excessive legislation and protect 
liberty, the framers established numerous procedural constraints 
that slow down the legislative process, prevent Congress from 
reaching bad compromises without careful deliberation, and of-
29. See, e.g., Schoenbrod, Power Without Responsibility at 122 (cited in note 2) (ar-
guing that "statutory laws are more likely to be taken as community standards of right 
and wrong than are agency laws"). 
96 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 17:79 
fer opportunities to block or delay legislation. The procedural 
obstacles that the critics of delegation point to are bicameralism, 
presentment, and, most importantly, the alleged ban on delega-
tion.30 
Critics suggest that delegation subverts these important 
constitutional limits on Congress's power. Delegation makes it 
easier for members of Congress to pass laws in the absence of a 
strong consensus, and thus more likely that Congress will pass 
laws without careful deliberation and restraint. While finding 
consensus will be harder in a world without delegation-in 
which members of Congress are forced to take responsibility for 
their decisions-the delays will be desirable since they will allow 
opportunities for more careful deliberation. In some cases, a 
ban on delegation may lead Congress to abandon attempts at 
regulation, an outcome that critics of delegation are often happy 
to embrace.31 
Once again, however, it is not certain that the only conse-
quences of enforcing a non-delegation doctrine are going to be 
the ones applauded by the doctrine's proponents. The claim that 
a non-delegation doctrine will force Congress to deliberate more 
carefully and inhibit excessive legislation is only believable if 
members of Congress cannot find alternative means of reaching 
compromises in the absence of delegation. As things now stand, 
delegation is not the only means used by members of Congress 
to find compromises that break stalemates or to avoid responsi-
bility. If the courts made it impossible for Congress to delegate, 
Congress would be likely to substitute one or more of those 
other means. 
For example, legislators deprived of their power to delegate 
might instead try to reach compromises by increasing pork bar-
rel spending or by logrolling regulatory programs into huge om-
nibus bills. Such practices are already notorious in those policy 
areas in which Congress now passes detailed legislation (e.g., 
taxes and appropriations). Recognizing that the consequences 
of pork barreling might be even worse than the consequences of 
delegation, critics of delegation deny that these alternative 
methods of reaching compromise are a significant concern. 
Aranson, Gellhorn, and Robinson, for example, reject the sug-
gestion that Congress would increase pork barrel spending, 
30. For an extended discussion of these issues, see id. at 107-18. 
31. See, e.g., id. at 135-36, 139-42. Aranson, Gellhom, and Robinson, 68 Cornell L. 
Rev. at 63-65 (cited in note 1), make similar claims. 
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claiming: "This argument assumes that the legislature is not al-
ready maximizing its return from pork-barrel (private-goods) 
production. We assume the contrary, however, and conclude 
that an increase in the cost of delefation will reduce the total 
output of inappropriate legislation.''3 
Aranson, Gellhorn, and Robinson's contrary assumption is 
itself implausible, as can be seen by using a market metaphor. 
Enforcing a non-delegation doctrine would presumably change 
legislators' calculations about the costs of pork barreling. Rais-
ing the cost of delegation (or removing delegation from that 
market altogether) will presumably make legislators eager to 
purchase more of a substitute good, in this case, pork-barrel leg-
islation. Thus, the level at which a legislature maximizes its re-
turn from pork-barrel production in a world of rampant delega-
tion may be much lower than the level at which returns will be 
maximized in a world with a judicially enforced non-delegation 
doctrine. Presumably, Congress would also adjust to the world 
without delegation by making its internal structure more condu-
cive to alternative means of reaching compromises.33 
Even beyond the problems posed by alternative means of 
forming compromises, there are compelling reasons to think that 
the critics have offered a flawed analysis of Congress's incentives 
with regard to constitutional limitations inhibiting excessive leg-
islation. The critics' arguments suggest that delegation is a sign 
of a legislation-mad Congress trying to subvert structural con-
trols that inhibit legislative compromises. This assumption 
seems quite odd when tested against the internal procedural 
rules that Congress has created for itself. Many of those rules 
32. Aranson, Gellhorn, and Robinson, 68 Cornell L. Rev. at 64 n.246 (cited in note 
1 ). 
33. Stewan discusses the possibility of Congress responding to a ban on delegation 
by relying on more internal delegation to committees. Stewan, 36 Am. U. L. Rev. at 331-
32 (cited in note 4). Schoenbrod himself mentions Justice Breyer's suggestion that Con-
gress simply adopt agency rules as statutes, an outcome that would presumably defeat 
much of the gain in accountability from judicial enforcement of the non-delegation doc-
trine, unless Congress chose to vote separately on each rule, a very unlikely outcome. 
Schocnbrod, 20 Cardozo L. Rev. at 765 (cited in note 27). The anicle by Stephen Breyer, 
The Legislative Veto After Chadha, 72 Geo. L.J. 785 (1984), also provides a reminder of a 
past lesson about the capacity of legislators to get around coun rulings that seem on the 
surface to deny Congress the ability to be flexible in designing administrative processes. 
The Supreme Coun's famous ruling "ending" the legislative veto in Immigration and 
Naturalization Service v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983), like the non-delegation doctrine, 
attempted to limit Congress's power by reassening constitutional limits on Congress's 
P?~er .. But while Chadha attracted a. great deal of attention, the decision-making flexi-
bility gJVen to Congress by the Constitution left Congress with numerous means of get-
ting around the force of the coun's opinion. See Breyer, supra. 
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make it much harder for legislation to pass, not easier. Members 
of Congress have created the filibuster in the Senate, rules lim-
iting amending activity in the House, and the decentralization 
institutionalized through the committee system and weak institu-
tional sources of party cohesion.34 These rules and practices of-
ten inhibit the passage of legislation by increasing the veto points 
for opponents, and often make it more difficult to form corn-
promises. A Congress bent on finding easy compromises and 
subverting the Constitution's structures for inhibiting legislation 
would presumably have adopted a different way of proceeding. 
A more fundamental shortcoming in the third explanation 
appears when one looks beyond the federal legislature to state 
and local governments. One possible and perhaps likely conse-
quence of a judicially enforced non-delegation doctrine is that 
many regulatory functions currently performed by the federal 
government would be taken over by the states. Once again, this 
is a consequence that some critics of delegation are quite happy 
to ernbrace.35 
Presumably, critics of delegation are comfortable returning 
regulatory powers to the states because they are confident that 
state governments will exercise power more responsibly than the 
federal government. Surprisingly, however, the critics don't fully 
explain why they are so confident. Schoenbrod, for example, 
provides some examples of states successfully creating responsi-
ble regulatory programs, but is also forced to concede that James 
Madison believed that the state governments were more suscep-
tible to capture by factions.36 Without making a further positive 
argument, Schoenbrod concludes his discussion of state govern-
ments by stating that states should be given the power to take 
over federal regulatory functions "unless we have a good reason 
to distrust state government more than we distrust national gov-
ernment. "37 
Schoenbrod and other critics of delegation may be covertly 
buying into the arguments of modern day states' rights advo-
34. Walter J. Oleszek, Congressional Procedures and the Policy Process (Congres-
sional Quarterly Press, 4th ed. 1996), contains a readable overview of congressional pro-
cedures and their effect on decision making. None of the rules and institutional practices 
just listed arc required by the Constitution. Congress created them and could also aban-
don them. 
35. See, e.g., Schoenbrod, Power Without Responsibility at 136-39 (cited in note 2). 
36. Id. at 137. Schocnbrod responds to Madison by claiming that such concerns are 
less relevant in the modem world where "most states surpass the entire original thirteen 
in population and diversity." Id. 
37. ld. 
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cates, who repeat as mantra the claim that state governments are 
"closer" to the people than is the federal government in Wash-
ington, and thus are less likely to pass excessive regulations that 
interfere with liberty. But that claim is certainly open to chal-
lenge in a modern world of mass communication, where people 
participate at much higher rates in federal than in state or local 
elections. Furthermore, while some state capitals are today hot-
beds of anti-regulatory sentiment, there is no historical pattern 
linking level of government with opposition to regulation or pro-
tection of liberty. William Novak's recent comprehensive ac-
count of law and regulation in the nineteenth century destroys 
the myth that state and local governments did not regulate the 
economy or interfere with liberty in the nineteenth century. No-
vak exhaustively documents efforts by state and local govern-
ments to regulate "nearly every aspect of early American econ-
omy and society, from Sunday observance to the carting of 
offal."38 
It is, of course, unlikely that state governments would re-
spond to judicial enforcement of a non-delegation doctrine by 
exercising the same regulatory powers that they exercised in the 
nineteenth century. The more important and more general les-
son that emerges from accounts like Novak's is that state gov-
ernments retain broad and undefined police powers under our 
Constitution, powers that the states would be free to exercise 
should federal power go into remission. 
These expansive and largely undefined police powers of the 
states should be especially disturbing to someone like Schoen-
brod, who insists that the people are not smart enough to use 
electoral controls on government officials to protect liberty, and 
that judges need to step in to supplement those electoral controls 
by enforcing constitutional limits on the power of those elected 
officials.39 Schoenbrod's lack of faith in electoral controls can be 
seen in his insistence that the Supreme Court intervene to en-
force the non-delegation doctrine. Schoenbrod argues that such 
judicial interference is necessary because the people are not 
clever or attentive enough to use the ballot to protect liberty or 
38. William J. Novak, The People's Welfare: Law and Regulation in Nineteenth-
Century America I (U. of North Carolina Press, 1996). For additional perspective on 
regulation by state courts (often without the nuisance of statutory law) in the nineteenth 
century, see Morton J. Horwitz, The Transformation of American Law, 1780-1860 (Har-
vard U. Press, 1977); Karen Orren, Belated Feudalism: Labor, the Law, and Liberal De-
velopment in the United States (Cambridge U. Press, 1991). 
39. Schoenbrod, Power Without Responsibility at 170-73 (cited in note 2). 
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end excessive regulation.40 Ironically, however, state legislators 
are not subject to many of the constitutional limits that Schoen-
brod sees as essential for producing accountability in the federal 
system.41 State laws don't even need to be made by legislatures!42 
Given that Schoenbrod concedes that state governments are 
likely to assume expanded regulatory functions in the aftermath 
of a judicially enforced non-delegation doctrine, the absence of 
many of those constitutional controls on the powers of state gov-
ernments seems to provide the "good reason to distrust state 
government more than we distrust national government" that 
Schoenbrod was searching for. 
Ironically, one limit on federal power that does not seem to 
apply to the states is the non-delegation doctrine itself. While 
Schoenbrod and other critics of delegation can imaginatively de-
rive a constitutional prohibition on delegation by placing a par-
ticular gloss on a particular piece of constitutional text (the first 
sentence in Article 1),43 there is almost nothing in the Constitu-
tion that suggests that a similar prohibition applies to state gov-
ernments.44 As state governments assume important regulatory 
functions now performed by the federal government, it is un-
likely that the private interests that are now so successful at 
pressuring Congress will simply wither away. Their more likely 
response will be to expand operations in the state capitals. Once 
there, there is nothing that prevents them from recreating at the 
state level the incentives to shift many important regulatory de-
cisions to state regulatory agencies. And there is nothing in the 
case law of the nineteenth or twentieth centuries that could sup-
port a Supreme Court effort to stop the state governments 
should they decide to delegate more. 
Of course, there is no way to know for certain the extent to 
which Congress and the states would make these adjustments in 
response to judicial intervention. But in the face of Schoen-
40. ld. 
41. Of coun;c, some critics of regulation complain that many of the limits on federal 
power have been eliminated in practice during this century as the courts have adopted 
expansive definitions of Congress's enumerated powers, especially the commerce power. 
But parallel limits on state powers do not even exist in theory. 
42. Marci A. Hamilton, Power, Responsibility, and Republican Democracy, 93 
Mich. L. Rev. 1539 (1995) (reviewing David Schoenbrod, Power Without Responsibility 
(1993)) discusses the importance of making state ballot initiatives a part of the discussion 
on the non-delegation doctrine. 
43. Schoenbrod, Power Without Responsibility at 155-57 (cited in note 2). 
44. Ely suggests that the courts locate a ban on state delegation in the guarantee 
clause. Democracy and Distrust at 240-41 n.78 (cited in note 13). I think Ely's resort to 
the guarantee clause speaks for itself. 
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brod's admitted uncertainty about what the world will look like 
without delegation, the possibility of state government delega-
tion, coupled with the much broader police powers retained by 
the states, creates a counterweight to the optimistic presumption 
that curbing federal delegation will result in less regulation 
and/or more liberty. While the non-delegation doctrine may re-
invigorate some constitutional limits on federal legislative pow-
ers, gains made at the federal level could be more than offset as 
regulatory responsibilities shift to a level of government that is 
less subject to the constitutional restraints that Schoenbrod 
thinks are essential to protecting liberty. 
III. THE CONTINUING ROLE OF THE COURTS 
In addition to considering the changed role state and local 
governments might play in the aftermath of the non-delegation 
doctrine, it is important to consider the changed role of the 
courts. In particular, it is important to consider whether judges 
will end up assuming responsibility for making a large number of 
the "hard choices" that Congress now delegates to the agencies. 
The practice of legislators deferring important decisions to 
the courts in order to avoid responsibility for difficult policy 
choices is not without historic precedent.45 Before delegation to 
executive branch agencies became such a common practice, leg-
islative default and judicial regulation was more the norm than 
the exception in many areas of policy making. In the nineteenth 
century, judge-made common law constituted a significant part 
of legal regulation of both the economy and private conduct. 
Many aspects of daily life were regulated by judges without 
authorization or involvement of legislators. Some scholars have 
mistaken the shortage of legislative regulation in the nineteenth 
century for a laissez faire economic system. But over the past 
few decades, James Willard Hurst, Morton Horwitz and the gen-
eration of legal historians that they inspired have tried to correct 
that mistake by tracing the important constitutive power of law 
and judicial regulation in the nineteenth century.46 
The relative significance of the common law in the nine-
teenth century "state of courts and parties"47 is worth consider-
45. See, e.g., Mark A. Graber, The Non Majoritarian Difficulty: Legislation Defer-
ence to the Judiciary, 7 Studies in American Political Development 35 (1993). 
46. For a discussion of these issues and review of the literature, see Novak, The 
People's Welfare at 19-50 (cited in note 38). 
47. See Stephen Skowroneck, Building a New American State: The Expansion of 
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ing because the conduct of legislators during that pre-delegation 
era was in many respects similar to the conduct they engage in 
today when they delegate: Nineteenth century legislators rou-
tinely deferred to judicial law-making as a means of avoiding ac-
countability for divisive decisions. Understanding the role of 
judges in the nineteenth century is crucial for making an accu-
rate assessment of how accountability was damaged or improved 
by the development of the modern administrative state. 48 
Schoenbrod suggests that before the development of the 
administrative state, our political system was one in which judges 
were able to ensure accountability by preventing delegation and 
thus forcing legislators to take principled stands divisive policy 
issues. Schoenbrod bases his account of pre-New Deal govern-
ance and accountability on two things: 1) The observation that 
the federal government did not create independent regulatory 
agencies until the twentieth century; and 2) a very small number 
of Supreme Court decisions articulating a rule against delega-
tion.49 But because he thinks of regulation and delegation only 
in their twentieth century forms, and then looks only at the case 
reporters for the Supreme Court for evidence of how law and 
governance worked before the New Deal, Schoenbrod ends up 
with a tremendously distorted picture of law, governance, and 
politics before the New Deal. That picture does not square at all 
with the accounts offered by scholars who have looked in more 
detail at how democratic processes actually worked before the 
creation of the modern administrative state. 
A powerful example is Stephen Skowronenck's very de-
tailed account of the transformation from the party system of the 
late nineteenth century to the modern administrative state. 
Skowroneck makes it clear that before the creation of the ad-
ministrative state, political competition was nothing like the sys-
tem Schoenbrod imagines in the past and aspires for in the fu-
ture. Accountability, such as it was, was not based on voters 
National Administrative Capacities, 1877·1920 at 39-46, 47-162 (Cambridge U. Press, 
1982). 
48. Nothing I say in this section is meant to establish that accountability could not 
be improved in the future if some decisions that are now delegated were instead made by 
legislators. But a proper understanding of the past is important, not just to counter the 
misleading historical claims made by proponents of the non-delegation doctrine, but also 
for understanding the complexity of the problem of accountability and for understanding 
why judges lack the power to create accountability through constitutional doctrines. I do 
not mean to deny that it is possible to create an improved system of democratic govern-
ance where there is both more accountability and less delegation. 
49. Schoenbrod, Power Without Responsibility at 30-31, 33-36 (cited in note 2). 
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responding after judges forced legislators to take principled 
stands on divisive policy issues. Rather, political competition 
was centered primarily on the distribution of patronage, and 
judges rather than legislators took responsibility for settling a 
broad range of important policy questions. 50 
Legislators did occasionally step in and codify some areas of 
law, usually after judicial rulings came under attack by reform-
ers.51 Often, however, nineteenth century legislators could avoid 
policy controversies by doing nothing at all, confident that the 
courts would go on making decisions _!lbout regulation as they 
announced evolving common law rules.'2 
Perhaps the most significant example of judicial regulation 
in the face of legislative default is provided by regulation of la-
bor relations. While nineteenth century legislators never dele-
gated power to a powerful centralized regulatory agency like the 
NLRB, that did not mean that legislators took responsibility for 
labor regulation, nor did it mean that labor organizations went 
unregulated. Christopher Tomlins/3 Karen Orren,54 David 
Montgomery,55 Victoria Hattam,;c, and William Forbath57 have all 
documented how judges controlled and shaped the labor move-
ment through such common law prohibitions as conspiracy, va-
grancy, and enticement, and later by enforcing yellow dog con-
tracts and issuing injunctions. Because of this web of judicial 
controls, legislators in the nineteenth century could be confident 
that labor would not roam free even if legislators never took 
clear stands on divisive issues of labor regulation. 58 
50. Skowroneck, Building a New American State (cited in note 47). 
51. Charles M. Cook, The American Codification Movement: A Study of 
Antebellum Legal Reform (Greenwood Press, 1981). 
52. Of course, regulation by judges is not the same thing as regulation by agency 
bureaucrats. The judiciary is probably more insulated from political pressures than the 
agencies, a feature that gives legislative deference to judges both advantages and disad-
vantages over legislative delegation. 
53. Christopher L. Tomlins, The State and the Unions: Labor Relations, Law and the 
Organized Labor Movement in America, 1880-1960 (Cambridge U. Press, 1985): Christo-
pher L. Tomlins, Law, Labor, and Ideology in the Early American Republic (Cambridge 
U. Press, 1993). 
54. Orren, Belated Feutkllism (cited in note 38). 
55. David Montgomery, Citizen Worker: The Experience of Workers in the United 
States with Democracy and the Free Market During the Nineteenth Century 52·114 (Cam-
bridge U. Press, 1993). 
56. Victoria C. Hattam, Labor Visions and State Power: The Origins of Business 
Unionism in the United States (Princeton U. Press, 1993). 
57. William E. Forbath, Law and the Shaping of the American Labor Movement 
(Harvard U. Press, 1991). 
58. Schoenbrod's response to concerns about the role of common law courts in the 
nineteenth century is to claim that common law is more democratic than agency law be-
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Do any important lessons about the limits of a non-
delegation doctrine emerge from these observations regarding 
deference to judicial policymaking in the nineteenth century? 
Past experience with common law regulation seems on the sur-
face to be of limited relevance today. The "state of courts and 
parties" of the nineteenth century was replaced by the modern 
administrative state because judge-centered regulation lacked 
the capacity to administer the regulatory tasks that needed to be 
performed in the complex economy of the twentieth century.59 
After a century of codification of regulatory policies by legisla-
tures and agencies, it seems very unlikely that judge-made law 
could substitute for very much of the agency law that would be 
dismantled by a non-delegation doctrine. More importantly, if I 
am assuming that judges are enforcing a non-delegation doc-
trine, I should also be willing to assume that those judges have a 
strong commitment to forcing legislators to act responsibly. 
There is no reason to think such judges would conspire with leg-
islators in further efforts to regulate without legislation. 
Nevertheless, I think proponents of the non-delegation doc-
trine still need to be quite concerned about the possibility that 
ending delegation will lead legislators to rely on judges to re-
solve conflicts over policy choices. The common law is not the 
only means through which legislative deference to the courts can 
result in a shift of policy-making responsibility from legislators 
to judges. In a future world without delegation, the more rele-
vant strategy of legislative deference to the courts would proba-
bly be deliberate ambiguity in legislative language. This legisla-
tive strategy for avoiding accountability is often overlooked 
despite the fact that it has long been a most reliable and resilient 
tool for legislators wishing to avoid accountability.60 
cause it is derived from custom. "To the considerable extent that common law grows out 
of community custom, it reflects a popular consensus and so is no less democratic than 
statutory law." Schoenbrod, Power Without Responsibility at 157 (cited in note 2). 
There may be some contexts in which such a claim is plausible. But the claim of demo-
cratic custom appears almost ludicrous in the context of judicial regulation of the econ-
omy in the nineteenth century as documented in the above-cited sources on labor history 
and by accounts such as Novak's. Schoenbrod also suggests in private correspondence 
that the policy-making role of the courts in the nineteenth century is "inflated in retro-
spect." Much recent historical work on the role of the courts during that period supports 
precisely the opposite conclusion-that the important regulatory role of the courts has 
been badly underestimated. Letter to author, dated 8/19199 (on file with author). 
59. Skowroneck, Building a New American State (cited in note 47). 
60. In an earlier unpublished paper, I noted that many scholars of statutory inter-
pretation notice the importance of deliberate legislative ambiguity, but also argue that 
few of them bother to incorporate the problems created by deliberate ambiguity into 
their models and explanations. George I. Lovell, Deference, Denial, and Labor Legis/a-
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Two studies that I conducted of labor reform legislation 
demonstrate the importance of the strategy of legislative ambi-
guity.61 My studies re-examined nineteenth and early twentieth 
century conflicts between legislatures and the courts by looking 
at the evolution of several failed reform statutes. The statutes I 
looked at gave rise to notorious instances of alleged judicial in-
terference with legislative reforms. I was able to show in several 
cases that the failure of the statutes to attain their advertised 
goals was not the result of judicial usurpation of legislative 
power, as earlier scholars had claimed. The failure was instead 
the result of legislators deliberately using ambiguity in statutory 
language to shift responsibility for difficult decisions to judges. 
This political strategy seemed to work even as the reforms failed: 
Judges typically received most of the blame after they (quite 
predictably) resolved the ambiguity in the statutes with interpre-
tations that hurt the interests of labor organizations. 
I first found examples of such deliberate legislative ambigu-
ity in nineteenth century state statutes aimed at judges who were 
using the common law of criminal conspiracy to control labor 
organizations.62 A subsequent longer study found that ambiguity 
remained an important legislative strategy in a series of federal 
statutes from 1898-1935, a period that covers the crucial transi-
tion from the nineteenth century common law system to the New 
Deal administrative system.63 
Of course, examples of past use of legislative ambiguity are 
only relevant here if it is likely that legislators will respond to 
strict enforcement of a non-delegation doctrine by using ambi-
guity to shift decisions to judges. My initial but incomplete an-
swer is to point out that legislators have never stopped using the 
strategy of deliberate ambiguity. Even as Congress has increas-
ingly relied on delegation, judges continue to make important 
policy decisions as they interpret statutes and oversee decisions 
made in the agencies. Legislators are well aware of the impor-
tant role of judges as interpreters of statutes when they draft 
tion: Rethinking Judicial Policymaking, Legislative Decision Making, and Democratic 
Accountability, Paper presented at the Law and Society Association Annual Meeting, 
Aspen, Colorado, June 4-7, 1999 (on file with author). 
61. George I. Lovell, The Ambiguities of Labor's Legislative Reforms in New York 
State in the Late Nineteenth Century, 8 Studies in American Political Development, 81 
(1994); George I. Lovell, Legislative Deferrals and Judicial Policy Making in American 
Labor Law, Ph.D. Dissertation, Political Science, University of Michigan (1997) (on file 
with author). 
62. Lovell, Ambiguities of Labor's Legislative Reforms (cited in note 61). 
63. Lovell, Legislative Deferrals (cited in note 61). 
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legislation, and have not always been able to resist the tempta-
tion to use open-ended language to shift important policy deci-
sions to judges. 
The continuity between pre- and post-New Deal use of de-
liberate ambiguity can be seen by considering the Wagner Act. 
The Wagner Act was a quintessential New Deal statute that es-
tablished a permanent regulatory agency (the NLRB) and dele-
gated important policy-making functions to that agency. My 
earlier study found evidence that even as Congress was perfect-
ing the growing practice of delegation to executive branch agen-
cies, Congress was also establishing important oversight respon-
sibilities for judges and artfully using ambiguity in legislative 
language to make sure that judges would have the final say over 
at least some particular policy controversies.64 
The possibility of legislators using ambiguity in legislative 
language as a tool for shifting accountability to judges is not un-
limited. In some policy contexts, (e.g., criminal law or laws that 
have a plausible chilling effect on free speech) judges may be in-
clined to strike down ambiguous laws on grounds of overbreadth 
or vagueness.65 But despite doctrines that discourage vagueness 
and ambiguity, judges spend a tremendous amount of time and 
energy resolving interpretive controversies about the meaning of 
statutes. Often, the courts are called on to make choices that 
Congress could have easily made when the statute was passed, 
and members of Congress continue to keep legislative language 
open-ended as a way of building consensus. One need look no 
further than recent interpretive decisions on the Americans with 
Disabilities Act and sexual harassment to realize that Congress 
has not given up on the practice. 66 
Defenders of the non-delegation doctrine might still object 
that judges inclined to end delegation will also take steps to end 
deference to the courts through legislative ambiguity, perhaps by 
more vigorously striking down laws that are open-ended or am-
64. ld. at 203-32. 
65. The requirement related to vagueness and overbreadth are themselves limited. 
See, e.g., Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 615 (1973). 
66. Journalists' accounts of deliberate ambiguity and subsequent judicial decisions 
appeared in both the New York Times and the Washington Post on the same day in 1998. 
See Fred Barbash, Congress Didn't So the Coun Did, Washington Post C1 (July 5, 1998); 
Linda Greenhouse, Sure Judges Legislate. They have co, New York Times 4:1 (July 5. 
1998). These articles discuss, among other things, the Americans with Disabilities Act 
(ADA), 104 Stat. 3Z7, 42 U.S.C. 12102, et seq (1994). The Supreme Court resolved one 
of many ongoing interpretive controversies about the meaning of the ADA in Surton v. 
United Air Lines, Inc. 119 S. Ct. 2139 (1999). 
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biguous.67 However, the task of limiting ambiguity in statutory 
language is very different from the task of limiting delegation of 
rule-making authority to the agencies. Even if judges can, in 
theory at least, hold legislators to a "no delegation" standard, 
they cannot possibly hold legislators to a "no ambiguity" stan-
dard. To expect legislators to resolve in advance all the interpre-
tive controversies that might arise as judges decide concrete 
cases is simply unreasonable. Scholars of statutory interpreta-
tion have recognized since at least the time of Aristotle that un-
expected situations and changes in background conditions make 
accidental ambiguity and the resulting interpretive controversies 
inevitable.68 
It is because defenders of delegation know that interpretive 
controversies cannot be eliminated that they are very careful to 
distinguish impermissible delegation to agencies from the inevi-
table and perfectly permissible interpretive role that judges will 
play as they apply legal rules. Schoenbrod, for example, recog-
nizes the problem of ambiguity and goes to considerable effort 
to explain that judges retain responsibility for interpreting stat-
utes in a world without delegation.69 He also offers several sug-
gestions for distinguishing law-making from law interpretation, 
and distinguishes statutes that delegate from statutes that are not 
specific.70 However, his suggested method for distinguishing 
statutes that allow for judicial interpretation from statutes that 
unconstitutionally delegate legislative power cannot distinguish 
interpretation that arises from accidental ambiguity from inter-
pretation that results from deliberate ambiguity. Schoenbrod 
does not even attempt to make that distinction. This omission is 
crucial because judges will have a very difficult time improving 
67. Some celebrated cases over the past few decades have been taken as a signal 
that judges have become less tolerant of this legislative strategy and more willing to try to 
force Congress to legislate clearly by shrinking their own role as interpreters of statutes. 
See, e.g., Chevron U.S.A. Inc., v. National Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 
(1984). Some critics of delegation have applauded these decisions as a sign of judges' 
interest in giving members of Congress incentives to pass clearer laws. Nevertheless, 
judges continue to make policy decisions of considerable consequence as they resolve 
ambiguities in statutes. For an empirical account of the complicated effects of Chevron 
on administrative decision making, see Peter H. Schuck and E. Donald Elliott, To the 
Chevron Station: An Empirical Study of Federal Administrative LAw, 1990 Duke L.J. 984, 
1020-43, 1058-59. 
68. R. Shep Melnick, Between the Lines: Interpreting Welfare Rights 8 (Brookings 
Institution, 1994 ). 
69. Schoenbrod, Power Without Responsibility at 189 (cited in note 2). 
70. Id at 181-85. 
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accountability through a non-delegation doctrine if they cannot 
prevent Congress from delegating to the courts. 
These problems are exacerbated by the fact that the con-
ventions judges follow when interpreting statutes are almost 
completely blind to the practice of deliberate deference to the 
courts through ambiguous legislative language. The competing 
methods judges use to discover, recover, or imaginatively recon-
struct the "intent" of Congress or the meaning of statutory texts 
invariably assume that ambiguity in statutes is the result of acci-
dents.71 And the conventions that judges observe when they pe-
ruse legislative records in search of "intent" make it very un-
likely that interpreters will uncover evidence of deliberate 
ambiguity.72 
The problem is that the interpretive conventions that judges 
follow when they attempt to resolve controversies about the in-
terpretation of statutes are tremendously misleading in cases in-
volving deliberate ambiguity. While committee reports and 
speeches by floor managers can be reliable sources for finding 
legislative intent when there is an intent to be found, they are 
also the least likely place in the congressional record to find evi-
dence of deliberate ambiguity. Committees and floor managers 
typically have the greatest stake in holding together a coalition 
that is built through ambiguity, and are thus much less likely to 
call attention to ambiguity than backbenchers who want to dis-
rupt that coalition. In my,study, I was able to uncover evidence 
71. Lovell, Deference, Denial, and Labor Legislacion (cited in note 60). 
72. For example, in my studies of labor legislation (cited in note 61), judges always 
responded to interpretive controversies by making a conventional, and very limited, in-
quiry into the legislative text and history and then announcing their discovery of the "in-
tent" of a unified Congress. After making a more extended inquiry into the legislative 
history, I was able to show that Congress had, in reality, deliberately used ambiguous or 
contradictory language to avoid establishing a single intent on the relevant policy choice 
and to force the courts to resolve the inevitable interpretive controversies that the statu-
tory language would create. The "intent" that the judges "discovered" was not the work 
of Congress, but something that the judges themselves manufactured through the inter-
pretive process. 
Significantly, I was able to explain the judicial decisions that manufactured intent 
without claiming that judges acted out of bad faith, conspiratorial motives, or a lack of 
interest in legislative integrity and congressional accountability. Their discovery of leg-
islative intent was the natural result of their reliance on conventional methods for read-
ing legislative histories. Those methods could probably not be better designed to hide 
evidence of deliberate legislative ambiguity. For example, in a notorious case interpret-
ing the Oayton Act of 1914, Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443 (1921}, 
the Supreme Court followed well-established interpretive conventions that tell judges to 
ignore most legislative records. The judges in Duplex were willing to exam~ne a~d. cite 
committee reports and floor speeches by the floor managers to support theu positiOns, 
but they ignored everything else. Id at 474-75. 
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of deliberate ambiguity only by rejecting interpretive conven-
tions and developing a method of interpreting legislative deci-
sions that looked at the full legislative record and the broader 
political context in which legislation passed. 73 
So long as judges retain the established conventions for 
working with legislative histories, the possibility of legislators 
successfully using ambiguity to force judges to decide conten-
tious issues remains a real one. Judges might try to eliminate 
this problem by abandoning the interpretive conventions and 
looking at more legislative records, but doing so would buck the 
current trend. Judges might even adopt some of the heretical 
practices I used in my second study, including looking at all the 
floor speeches and at rejected legislative proposals from earlier 
congresses. However, that is not a course I could recommend. 
In addition to being incredibly cumbersome and time-
consuming, the methods I used to uncover evidence of deliberate 
ambiguity in statutes are not foolproof. I designed a conserva-
tive set of conditions for identifying cases of deliberate ambigu-
ity that I hoped would minimize false positives (i.e., incorrectly 
concluding that an accidental ambiguity was deliberate). How-
ever, it was impossible to specify those conditions so that they 
did not allow false negatives (i.e., incorrectly concluding that de-
liberate ambiguity was accidental). The conditions I used were 
good enough for my purpose, which was only to demonstrate 
that deliberate ambiguity sometimes plays a significant role in in-
terbranch conflicts. But it is not good enough if the goal is to 
allow judges to identify and then strike down all statutes in 
which Congress makes deliberate use of ambiguity to avoid re-
sponsibility for some policy controversy. Based on my experi-
ence with early twentieth century labor statutes, I don't think the 
records legislators leave behind are sufficient to make those 
judgments with sufficient confidence. Furthermore, as soon as 
judges announced a new set of interpretive conventions that 
called for looking at additional records, legislators would pre-
73. Justice Scalia argues that judges should avoid all of these complications by giv-
ing up on the idea of finding legislative intent, ignoring legislative history, and sticking to 
the text of statutes to find their objective meanings. See, e.g., Antonin Scalia, A Matter 
of Interpretation: Federal Couns and the Law (Princeton U. Press 1997). However, 
judges will presumably have a hard time finding the objective meaning in the text of stat-
utes.that ar~ deliberately designed to be ambiguous and to generate interpretive contro-
v~rs•~s for Judges to resolve. In ~ses of deliberate textual ambiguity, the strategy of 
stlck.m~ to the ~ext ~as the oppos~t~ cffe~t to the one Scalia hopes for: The strategy 
maxJmJzes the discretion of the mdiVIdual JUdge to choose the policy outcome that he or 
she personally favors. 
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sumably adjust their behavior by keeping evidence of deliberate 
ambiguity out of those records. 
Thus, there is no guarantee that judges will recognize their 
own complicity in legislators' deliberate use of ambiguity, even 
in a post-delegation world in which conscientious judges want to 
restrict legislators' efforts to use ambiguity in statutes. If legisla-
tors did respond to a judicial prohibition on delegation by in-
creasing their use of ambiguity, they might not be able to shift 
responsibility for decisions to judges as reliably as they have 
been able to shift responsibility for making substantive regula-
tory rules to the executive branch. But even if the method of de-
ferral to the judiciary is less reliable, it still undermines the claim 
that the delegation doctrine forces legislators to assume respon-
sibility for regulatory choices. 
Moreover, the possibility of inadvertent judicial complicity 
in legislative efforts to avoid accountability threatens the legiti-
macy of judicial efforts to prevent delegation. If unelected 
judges decide to strike down ninety-nine percent of the regula-
tory laws that the people's representatives have passed over the 
last century in the name of forcing greater legislative account-
ability, those judges had better be pretty confident that doing so 
does not simply create the appearance of a judicial coup. Since 
one consequence of strict enforcement of a non-delegation doc-
trine is likely to be an increased judicial power to make substan-
tive decisions on regulatory policies, it would be quite difficult to 
avoid that appearance. Whether they like it or not, judges are 
likely to help Congress to continue to avoid accountability in the 
uncharted world without delegation. 
IV. CONCLUSION. BRINGING THE PEOPLE BACK IN 
The non-delegation doctrine is presented by many of its 
proponents as a tool for restoring the original vision of the fram-
ers of the Constitution.74 One lesson that seems to emerge from 
the above discussion is that judged by the standards for account-
ability offered by defenders of the non-delegation doctrine, the 
Constitution's system of separation of powers is a miserable fail-
ure. If the framers of the Constitution thought that they had 
provided for accountability and legitimacy by empowering 
judges to force elected legislators to make all the laws and rules, 
and if they thought they had done this by giving the courts the 
74. See, e.g., Schoenbrod, Power Without Responsibility at 155-58 (cited in note 2). 
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power to enforce a rule that prevents delegation to the executive 
branch, then the system that they established has thus far proven 
incapable of advancing their vision. We have never had either 
the majoritarian system envisioned by the counter-majoritarian 
framework, or the purely legislative system that the proponents 
of the non-delegation doctrine seek to restore. After more than 
two centuries, the Constitution has yet to coincide with a system 
in which popularly elected officials create and take responsibility 
for the bulk of our laws and regulations. 
The discussion above also makes it clear that the problem 
did not start with, and is not the result of, judicial weakness of 
will at the time of the New Deal. It has always been the case 
that much of the law in place under the Constitution has been 
created outside the legislative branch by unelected officials who 
elude direct accountability by democratic controls. Things don't 
look any better for the future. Even if future judges decide to 
enforce new restrictions on the legislative power to delegate, the 
remaining constitutional controls on legislative activities are 
much too porous to guarantee that legislators will make the 
"hard choices" or to ensure that they can be held directly ac-
countable for the choices that they make. 
The lesson that I wish to draw, however, is not that the 
framers failed to attain their vision, but that scholars have failed 
to identify correctly what that vision was. If the framers of the 
Constitution intended to establish a set of rules, procedures, and 
limitations that was sufficient, with appropriate judicial guid-
ance, to ensure majoritarian accountability, they made some 
very strange choices. In particular, the system they established 
seems woefully incomplete. Majoritarian accountability cannot 
be guaranteed merely by holding the elections required in the 
Constitution and forcing those who win the elections to make 
"hard choices." 
Whether or not the people can produce accountability in a 
democratic system depends on much more than giving people 
access to the ballot and easy knowledge of which choices elected 
legislators made on difficult policy issues. Knowledge of how 
one's elected representative voted on a divisive policy issue does 
not ensure that one can hold that representative accountable for 
making the wrong choice. The level and type of accountability 
achieved in any political system depends much more on a broad 
range of interrelated institutional and cultural factors. These 
factors include such things as basic constitutional structure (e.g., 
separation of powers/federal system vs. parliamentary systems) 
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system of representation (e.g., single member districts vs. pro-
portional representation), internal decision-making rules for 
legislatures (e.g., agenda control, amending power, committee 
structure, filibusters), rules regarding elections (e.g., secret bal-
lots or party ballots, access to the ballot, rules regarding patron-
age and campaign finance, procedures for drawing electoral dis-
tricts), the number of viable political parties, the level of public 
attention to politics, voter turnout, the amount of information 
available to the electorate, distribution of educational opportuni-
ties, and the structure and norms of the mass media (amount of 
competition, partisan press vs. "objective media"). 75 Significant 
changes in any of these factors can produce significant changes 
in who will be elected and in the kinds of policy choices those 
elected representatives will make. Such structural changes can 
lead to changes in outcomes even when the goals and prefer-
ences of the electorate remain unchanged. 
When it comes to these structural factors that affect ac-
countability, two things are striking about the choices made by 
the framers as they created the Constitution. The first is that 
they declined to make specific choices to influence a large num-
ber of the institutional and cultural factors just listed. The ex-
planation for the failure of the framers to make all the relevant 
choices is not that the framers lacked the wisdom or foresight to 
understand that such choices were important. The framers in-
stead trusted the people or their representatives to make most of 
those choices, and were content to establish a loose framework 
that has accommodated many different choices about important 
factors. The result is that the U.S. has experienced numerous 
successive democratic systems within the same constitutional 
framework, not a single correct system that has been disrupted 
by historical aberration or fits of judicial infidelity. 
The second is that when the framers did make specific 
choices, the choices that they made are quite often difficult to 
square with the assumption that the framers equated legitimacy 
with majoritarianism (tempered by a few individual rights), and 
difficult to square with the assumption that they equated ac-
countability with rule by legislators. Judged by those assump-
tions, many of the crucial decisions made by the framers are in-
75. On the importance of structural factors in the system of representation, see, 
e.g .• Douglas W. Rae, The Polirical Consequences of Electoral Laws (Yale U. Press, re~. 
ed. (1971 )). For a historical perspective on the importance of party structure and med1a 
conventions, see Michael E. McGerr, The Decline of Popular Policies: The American 
Nonh, 1865-1928 (Oxford U. Press, 1986). 
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explicable: for example, the decision to establish two other coe-
qual and independent branches of government, the decision to 
leave the states largely to their own devices, the decision to es-
tablish a Senate that was not chosen by popular election, and the 
decision to include a provision explicitly giving Congress the 
power to structure almost all of its internal decision-making pro-
cesses. 
I think the more charitable interpretation of the choices that 
the framers made is to assume that they wanted to balance their 
commitment to democratic rule by majoritarian legislatures with 
their very powerful misgivings about a purely legislative, purely 
majoritarian system. In a system with one supreme and elective 
branch of government, it would be quite easy for people to as-
sign blame for "hard choices" and to exact retribution for bad 
choices at the ballot box. But the framers decided not to create 
such a system. They instead created a separation of powers sys-
tem in which independent judicial and executive branches, not to 
mention independent state governments, act as a counterweight 
to legislative power. It was the original decision to establish the 
independent sources of power outside the legislature, and not 
judicial cowardice in the face of the New Deal, that makes it 
possible for legislators to find strategies that shift responsibility 
for difficult decisions. If the federal legislature did not have to 
compete with state governments and two coequal branches at 
the federal level, it would be much more difficult for legislators 
to hide behind the actions of others, and thus much easier to 
hold Congress accountable for unpopular outcomes. But it also 
would be much harder to limit the power of that lone majori-
tarian branch. Full accountability comes only at the cost of 
granting absolute power, and on that issue the framers made a 
very clear choice. 
The framers did not try to close off all the possible strate-
gies available to members of Congress who wanted to avoid 
taking responsibility for choices. But the framers also did not 
prevent the people from collectively creating a better system 
with more democracy and more accountability than the original 
system allowed. Such changes as the 15th, 17th, 19th, 23rd, 24th, 
and 26th amendments are examples of constitutional changes 
that demonstrate the continuing capacity of the people to create 
improvements in accountability and the democratic system 
within the existing framework. 
Likewise, the framers did not prevent the people from cre-
ating a political system with no delegation (like the one favored 
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by Schoenbrod), or from creating the "juridical democracy" en-
visioned by Lowi. The people could probably create such sys-
tems without changing the Constitution, and nothing I have said 
here contradicts the suggestion that the people would be better 
off if legislators delegated less power to the executive branch. 
But improvements will be much greater if delegation ends be-
cause the people develop an interest in holding legislators ac-
countable for unpopular decisions that are now made through 
delegation. The people are likely to develop the capacity to in-
sist on an end to delegation only if improvements in the way 
people are organized make it easier to hold legislators account-
able for the choices they make. 
So far, however, the people and their representatives have 
not constructed such a system. Efforts like Schoenbrod's and 
Lowi's to document the pathologies of the current system are no 
doubt a good way to convince the people to try something new. 
But it is doubtful that the courts could successfully impose on 
the people the type of system favored by Schoenbrod or Lowi 
before the people are capable of taking the ongoing steps 
needed to make such systems work. Ending delegation by judi-
cial fiat will only improve accountability if the underlying or-
ganizational pathologies that give rise to delegation are cured as 
well. The most that the courts can do is cure one symptom of 
the underlying disease. The Constitution leaves it up to the peo-
ple to develop the principles and capacities that will get us out of 
the current mess. 
Strong proponents of judicial intervention might object to 
the suggestion that these choices were simply left to the people 
acting through their elected representatives. Critics of delega-
tion might try to borrow a strategy advocated in a very different 
context by John Hart Ely.76 Ely argues quite powerfully that the 
constitutional system assigns to the courts at least some respon-
sibility for ensuring that representation works effectively and for 
making adjustments when representation breaks down. If critics 
like Schoenbrod are right that the people have failed to prevent 
their representatives from creating a distorted system with little 
accountability, perhaps judges should reinforce representation 
by forcing legislators to perform some particular version of their 
constitutionally mandated role as lawmakers. Judicial interven-
tion may be especially well justified given Schoenbrod's sugges-
tion that the people cannot check delegation because their 
76. Ely, Democracy and Distrust at 73-104 (cited in note 13). 
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elected representatives have effectively hidden the costs of the 
current system from the unsophisticated masses.n 
I think, however, that it is too soon to say that the people 
have failed, too soon to give up on the people as a potential 
source of solutions, and thus too soon to insist that the people 
have abdicated and need the help of judges if they are to con-
tinue the ongoing task of creating a "more perfect union." 
While the behavior of the people looks unsophisticated and in-
dolent to the critics of delegation, that may only be because 
those critics view accountability through the lens of legislative 
supremacy and the counter-majoritarian framework. In reality, 
the people may not be as foolish as the critics of delegation sug-
gest, or as helpless in the face of legislative deception. 
I found some evidence for these claims in my case studies of 
labor legislation. My cases provided instances of labor organiza-
tion attempting to use statutory changes to limit the ability of 
judges to interfere with workers' collective activities. Most of 
the statutes I looked at failed to achieve their advertised policy 
goals, in part because judges established interpretations of the 
statutes that were quite hostile to labor organizations. I showed, 
however, that the power of judges to make such decisions was 
the result of legislators' conscious choices to avoid settling divi-
sive policy issues and to instead make legislative language more 
ambiguous. 
On the surface, the labor cases seem to fit an explanation 
much like the one that critics of delegation give when attacking 
"rent-seeking" regulations emanating from the agencies. The 
explanation might be that better organized and more sophisti-
cated employers won their battles with labor because the em-
ployers were able to dupe the unsophisticated workers into ac-
cepting bad legislative compromises. On this explanation, judges 
concerned about reinforcing representation might have felt justi-
fied in refusing to enforce the ambiguous legislation. Doing so 
would aid the helpless workers who lacked the sophistication 
needed to tell the difference between insincere legislation and 
political triumphs. 
However, after looking more carefully at the legislative 
compromises from the perspective of labor organizations, I 
found that the surface explanation of labor's activities did not fit 
the facts. I found that instead of being dupes, labor organiza-
77. Schoenbrod, Power WithoUJ Responsibility at 92·93, 229 n.42 (cited in note 2). 
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tions had a very sophisticated understanding of the links be-
tween legislative language and the likely role to be played by the 
courts, and that they knowingly entered into and endorsed leg-
islative compromises that had little chance of delivering their 
stated policy goals. After discovering that labor leaders were 
not fools, I had to develop an alternative explanation for their 
behavior. I found that their apparently uninformed and unso-
phisticated activities were in reality a very capable response to a 
difficult array of organizational imperatives and political reali-
ties. By choosing to compromise at the appropriate moment, la-
bor leaders were able to attain important organizational goals, 
and their decisions ultimately put labor organizations in a better 
position to win longer-term goals by improving labor's political 
position for subsequent legislative bargaining.78 Ironically, labor 
organizations might not have gained as much if they had been in 
a fully majoritarian system where it was impossible to defer to 
the courts. The problem for labor organizations was not that the 
workers were fools, but that they did not have the power to win 
clear majoritarian victories. A strict ban on delegation to both 
the executive branch and the courts would not have solved that 
problem, and would have deprived them of the ability to use 
legislative bargaining and compromises to achieve longer-term 
goals. 
The important lesson that emerges from the labor example 
is that scholars should be careful about imputing particular goals 
to groups of people and then concluding that those groups are 
unsophisticated, incompetent, and in need of judicial assistance 
just because they don't achieve those goals. It is possible that 
behavior that looks unsophisticated is actually a rational adapta-
tion to a complicated political system in which power is widely 
dispersed. To evaluate accountability in any political system, it 
is crucial that researchers try to understand the barriers that the 
system creates from the perspective of those interests actually 
taking part in the political processes. They may discover impor-
tant advantages to the existing system that are invisible on the 
assumption that the goal of political activity is always clear cut 
legislative victories that produce favored policy outcomes or al-
low voters punish the responsible legislators. 
Similarly, the fact that the people continue to tolerate wide-
spread legislative delegation may be a more sophisticated choice 
than it appears to critics of delegation. While Schoenbrod has 
78. Lovell, Legislative Deferrals at 70-131, 192-202 (cited in note 61). 
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recently taken on an admirable crusade against the forces of 
elitism by taking the side of "outsiders" against the "insiders" 
who want to subvert democracy by allowing delegation/9 his un-
willingness to trust the people to solve these problems without 
the aid of judges does not demonstrate an unblinking faith in 
democratic processes. 
Furthermore, the choice to retain powerful institutional ri-
vals to Congress is not one that has always been imposed upon 
the unsuspecting masses from the duping powers above them. 
There have been numerous times in American history when re-
formers have advocated magic bullet solutions designed to re-
store accountability by taking authority away from Congress's 
rival branches. From the codification movements of the nine-
teenth century to FDR's court packing plan to Reagan era de-
regulation, these reforms have produced important adjustments 
in the roles and responsibilities of the different branches within 
the constitutional framework. One great advantage of the con-
stitutional system established by the framers is that it has al-
lowed those changes and adjustments to occur. It is especially 
significant to note that these movements have always stopped 
short of stripping Congress's rival branches of so much power 
that they ceased to function as important alternative sources of 
lawmaking authority. The codifiers of the nineteenth century 
did not rid us of the common law, the Court survived and rose 
again despite Roosevelt's plan, and the regulatory agencies 
Reagan found when he arrived in Washington, with a few excep-
tions like the ICC, seem to chug along. The decisions to stop 
short of destroying independent sources of rule-making power 
may not be as irrational as they seem to critics of delegation. In 
an increasingly diverse and divided society, organized groups 
hoping to hold government accountable may prefer bargaining 
processes that allow those groups to develop organizational 
strengths while hunting for helpful legislative compromises. 
Such a system may produce a more responsive and permeable 
government than the aU-or-nothing majoritarian system of ac-
countability favored by the advocates of the non-delegation doc-
trine. 
79. Schoenbrod, Delegarion and Democracy at 749,764 (cited in note 27). 
